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Do transition economies—countries that transformed from social-
ism to capitalism in the 1990s—exhibit good governance? If so, is the 
incidence or degree of good governance the same across these former 
socialist economies? Answers to these questions illuminate conditions 
that affect a society’s well-being; the quality of a country’s governance 
system is an important determinant of sustainable economic and social 
development.1 Indeed, some argue that the benefi ts of promoting good 
governance are so important that doing so has become both an objec-
tive and a condition of development assistance (Santiso 2001; Weiss 
2000). Here, the objective is to document the nature and scope of good 
governance among transition economies, and to explore explanations 
for variation across these countries.
Why does it matter if formerly socialist economies exhibit good 
governance? In transition economies, the process of transforming from 
socialism (where planners’ preferences for investing in heavy industry 
dominated) to capitalism (where consumer sovereignty rules) involved 
a signifi cant restructuring of the economy. In many of these countries, 
not only was there a need to develop previously unavailable service sec-
tors (fi nancial, legal, retail, and repair, for example) but also to engage 
in extensive renovation of infrastructure and production facilities. 
Moreover, just as the transition process put a relatively large portion of 
the population at risk in terms of economic and social well-being, the 
dismantling of existing institutions limited the availability of domestic 
resources with which to provide an adequate social safety net. Conse-
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quently, transition economies required assistance, and assistance tends 
to require that certain conditions be met.2 
Transition economies received international fi nancial and technical 
assistance not only to facilitate the transformation process (decentral-
izing and liberalizing economic activities), but also to reduce adverse 
consequences to households and fi rms associated with the socio-
economic changes (macroeconomic stabilization). Many of the condi-
tions upon which transition assistance was contingent were governance-
related (Brӓutigam 2000; Santiso 2001; Weiss 2000). For example, 
one of the foundations for establishing a market-oriented economy is 
allowing for widespread private-property ownership and, correspond-
ingly, the protection of private-property rights. At the beginning of the 
transition process, when property rights were not protected and bank-
ing institutions and regulations were not fully developed, these coun-
tries were not forthcoming with the investment expenditures needed in 
the transition economies to renovate industry or develop new sectors.3 
Improved fi nancial, economic, and social regulatory quality and rule of 
law were necessary to facilitate the type of institutional developments 
that promote investment. Indeed, Baniak, Cukrowski, and Herczyñski 
(2005); Bevan and Estrin (2004); Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer (2004); 
Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000); and others identify an extensive set of 
governance-related factors contributing to the receipt of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) among transition economies. International assistance 
became contingent upon successfully addressing these factors because 
they would improve the environment for investment (both domestic and 
FDI), which in turn would contribute to the successful completion of 
the transition process (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2002). 
Promoting or establishing good governance in transition economies 
was also important because the ability to distribute assistance to indi-
viduals and organizations in need appears to depend upon the “quality” 
of a country’s political, economic, and social institutions. In particu-
lar, the effectiveness and enforcement of rules that permit participation 
and call for accountability, and the absence of corruption in interactions 
within and between the government, civil society, and the private sec-
tor, not only promote good governance but also act to enhance the trans-
formation to a market-oriented economy. Documenting the transition 
process from the governance perspective further illuminates linkages 
between governance and development.4 
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Finally, because transition economies encompass a relatively large 
number of countries and represent a signifi cant and growing share of 
the international market, promoting good governance in these countries 
was linked to promoting global economic security and political stabil-
ity. Without efforts to promote good governance in transition econo-
mies, the initial chaotic and economically devastating impact of the 
transformation process could have escalated into a more widespread 
and sustained barrier to global efforts to reduce poverty and promote a 
better quality of life. For these reasons, evaluating the level and varia-
tion in good governance among transition economies enhances under-
standing of the link between governance and development.
Good Governance as a Process 
Introduced in a 1989 World Bank report as an objective (Santiso 
2001), good governance is best conceived of as a process. Gover-
nance, generally, is the process not only of decision making, but also 
of decision implementation—a process that takes place at international, 
national, regional/local, and fi rm levels, involving both formal and 
informal agents and institutions. The governance process encompasses 
political, economic, and social dimensions, such as selecting, monitor-
ing, and replacing individuals who hold positions of authority; develop-
ing and implementing policies to manage natural, physical, fi nancial, 
and human resources; and promoting social cohesion, thus enabling 
vulnerable individuals and groups to experience inclusion and social 
protection (Kaufmann 2005). 
Good governance, a normative concept, requires that a number of 
conditions are satisfi ed: that is, that the processes of decision making 
and implementation are transparent, accountable, participatory, respon-
sive, consensus-oriented, equitable, effective, and follow the rule of 
law (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón 1999). Good governance 
means that suffi cient information is readily available to determine 
whether decisions are made and implemented following existing rules 
and regulations; that consequences can be imposed on those deciding or 
implementing policy; that all individuals have opportunities to express 
their opinions or cast their “vote”; that affected individuals’ concerns 
or needs are specifi cally addressed; that different views of the best 
interest of the “community” over an extended time frame are explicitly 
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considered; that no one individual or group has an inherent advantage 
in the process or outcome; that the adopted policies do not preclude 
or impede resources (physical, fi nancial, human) from going to their 
highest-valued use; and that the legal system not only enforces the laws 
impartially, but also with an eye toward fully protecting human rights 
(United Nations 2013). 
Changing Perception of Good Governance    
While much of the governance literature focuses on the link between 
governance and development, there has clearly been a change in the 
perception of good governance since the late 1990s. Before the global 
fi nancial crisis in 1998, the “Washington consensus” (Williamson 1990) 
dominated development thinking. Policymakers were persuaded that a 
limited role by the state was most infl uential in promoting economic 
growth. Indeed, a widespread belief that open trade, deregulation, 
privatization, and fi scal restraint enhanced development contributed to 
the result that these elements became conditions for international aid 
(Santiso 2001). 
As events unfolded after 1998, however, the governance literature 
began to refl ect a growing understanding that legal, economic, political, 
and social institutions that promote participation, strengthen account-
ability, regulate fi nancial markets, enhance the rule of law, and provide 
social safety nets are important in the development process (Craig and 
Porter 2006). Rather than seeking to limit state intervention, as was 
called for by the “Washington consensus,” there emerged in the litera-
ture a commitment to strengthening leadership at the national, local, 
and fi rm levels. As Santiso (2001) points out, the “targets” or conditions 
required of aid recipients rose from 10 in the 1980s to more than 25 
in the 1990s; Kyrgyzstan faced nearly 100 governance-related condi-
tions in 1999. It is worth noting that conditionality does not eliminate 
the situation where promises are made by an aid recipient to undertake 
changes and adopt policies consistent with good governance but then 
those promises are reneged on by the recipient.
To document the nature and scope of good governance in transi-
tion economies and explore explanations for variation across these 
countries, the next section, “Governance Measures,” briefl y reviews 
the issues involved in evaluating good governance and the governance 
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measures most widely used. The third section, “Comparing Transition 
Economies,” explains why transition economies typically are grouped 
into two categories. Section Four, “Good Governance in Transition 
Economies: Comparing FSU with CEE Countries,” utilizes multiple 
governance measures to illustrate different dimensions of good gov-
ernance in transition economies. Section Five, “Good Governance in 
Transition Economies: Firms’ Perspective and Experience,” focuses on 
how fi rms view good governance. The fi nal section offers a summary 
and concluding remarks.
GOVERNANCE MEASURES 
How is governance—the process of decision making and decision 
implementation in the social, political, and economic realms—mea-
sured? Kaufmann and Kraay (2007) provide a straightforward analy-
sis of governance measurement issues. First, focusing on what is mea-
sured, they discuss the pros and cons of using inputs or outcomes to 
measure the quality of governance. Inputs include rules, regulations, 
institutions, and practices that have consequences for the processes of 
decision making and implementation. For example, rules-based gov-
ernance measures such as the Polity IV Project or the two prepared by 
the World Bank—1) the Doing Business Project and 2) the Database on 
Political Institutions—consider such things as legislation that prohibits 
corruption, formal disclosure requirements for public offi cials, partici-
patory elections, political competition, constraints on executive author-
ity, rules for registering property or employing workers, and the like. 
While it is relatively easy to count rules, regulations, agencies, 
and other inputs, governance measures based on input counts remain 
problematic. Little variation in rules-based measures occurs over time 
or across countries, which limits their explanatory power in empiri-
cal analyses of governance. Moreover, rules-based measures contain 
an inherent ambiguity: do a large number of rules or regulations or 
agencies signal good governance or simply underscore the likelihood 
of confl ict among them? More importantly, the existence of a range 
of inputs does not guarantee their enforcement. Kaufmann and Kraay 
(2007) discuss issues associated not only with confl icting rules but also 
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with the existence of an enforcement gap. They use this discussion as 
a way to introduce an alternative measure of governance that uses out-
comes (e.g., the Global Integrity Index), focusing on the enforcement 
of rules and the lack of corruption. Kaufmann and Kraay (2007), Arndt 
and Oman (2006), and others note that, given that perceptions and arbi-
trary scales are used in compiling these outcome measures, they too 
need to be treated and utilized with caution. 
In their analysis of governance measurement issues, Kaufmann 
and Kraay (2007) next address how governance might be measured. 
They discuss the role and relative merits of both perceptions (based on 
experts and survey responses) and objective data (counts of regulations, 
bribe payments, court cases, and so forth) in how governance measures 
are constructed. For example, while gathering information from experts 
(lawyers, nongovernmental organization (NGO) offi cers, government 
offi cials, executives, and commercial risk rating agencies) is a rela-
tively low-cost endeavor, this method introduces potential biases that 
may undermine the quality or accuracy of the governance measure. 
That is, assessments necessarily refl ect experts’ views, and the data they 
elect to view informs their perceptions. Moreover, survey data collected 
from fi rms and individuals, the benefi ciaries of good governance, may 
suffer from inaccurate responses (how does one elicit truthful answers 
about illegal activities?) or bias in either the responses themselves or 
the interpretation of those responses (how does one code a situation 
where a bribe is paid, but the benefi t is suffi cient relative to cost to 
result in the bribe not being perceived as an obstacle?). Yet, given that 
both formal and informal rules and institutions infl uence political, civil, 
economic, and fi nancial transactions, perceptions provide more insight 
into the practice or process of good governance than simple counts of 
administrators, agencies, bribe payments, court cases, regulations, and 
the like. 
This analysis considers a range of governance measures to more 
fully depict the nature and scope of good governance in transition 
economies.
The broadest, most comprehensive measure, and one where the req-
uisite data are collected from former socialist economies, Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), is based exclusively on perceptions 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010). The WGI measure encom-
passes six dimensions of governance: 1) control of corruption, 2) gov-
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ernment effectiveness, 3) political stability, 4) regulatory quality, 5) rule 
of law, and 6) voice and accountability, using 30 indicators collected 
from 33 different organizations.5 The data used to construct the six WGI 
composite measures refl ect the perceptions of experts (from both the 
public and private sectors and from NGOs) and include survey data col-
lected from thousands of individuals and hundreds of fi rms per country. 
For country comparison purposes, each of the six WGI composite mea-
sures is standardized to have a zero mean and unit standard deviation. 
Positive scores refl ect good governance. 
Freedom House, a private nonprofi t organization established in 
the early 1940s by Eleanor Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie, conducts 
an annual survey of more than 190 countries to determine how free-
dom is experienced by people and fi rms.6 The country ratings, based 
on questions targeting political rights (10 questions) and civil liberties 
(15 questions), are constructed by country specialists rather than from 
actual experiences of fi rms or individuals. The political and civil liber-
ties composite measures are averaged to determine an overall country 
status of “free,” “partly free,” or “not free.” Good governance is associ-
ated with “free” status. 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), produced by Transparency 
International for the fi rst time in 1995, ranks 176 countries (including 
former socialist economies) and territories by their perceived level of 
public-sector corruption, based on opinion surveys and expert assess-
ments.7 The composite index is constructed from information collected 
from at least three sources (for some countries, up to 14 sources) and 
aggregated in such a way as to make the CPI composite more reliable 
than the individual scores covered in the composite (Saisana and Saltelli 
2012). The country mean value is derived from a standardization pro-
cedure that puts the composite index score between 10 (no corruption) 
and 0 (widespread corruption). Confi dence intervals also are reported 
to underscore the uncertainty associated with the perceived corruption 
measures (Lambsdorff 2007). Good governance is associated with a 
high CPI. 
The Heritage Foundation, in collaboration with the Wall Street 
Journal, annually provides an Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), 
which is constructed using 10 components related to private property 
rights protection, limited government intervention in economic affairs, 
ease of starting and closing a business, worker protection regulations, 
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and free trade; each component is averaged into a single score.8 This 
measure is used in governance studies because it includes dimensions 
that refl ect the process of making, implementing, and enforcing deci-
sions and policies that affect individuals and fi rms. The IEF uses data 
compiled by such organizations as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the Economist Intelligence Unit, generating a 
composite score for each country that ranges from 0 to 100, where 
100 conveys maximum freedom. The country score and ranking are 
designed to refl ect the degree of economic freedom exhibited in more 
than 175 countries (including former socialist economies).9 Thus, good 
governance is associated with a high IEF score. 
An alternative way to assess good governance is from the perspec-
tive of the benefi ciaries, such as fi rms. The European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD), in collaboration with the World 
Bank, began in 1999 conducting a Business Environment and Enter-
prise Performance Survey (BEEPS), which involves, in the most recent 
round (2008–2009), some 11,800 fi rms in 29 countries.10 The survey is 
designed to track changes in the business environment over time and get 
information from fi rms about the nature and scope of the state’s infl u-
ence over private-sector activities. In particular, the survey addresses a 
number of factors related to perceptions of the quality of the business 
environment, the incidence and magnitude of corruption, and problems 
associated with corruption in transition economies. BEEPS data allow 
for the assessment of governance quality from the fi rm’s perspective.11 
For example, the microdata permit analysis of two basic types of cor-
rupt transactions: in one type of transaction, state agents obtain unwar-
ranted benefi ts from the private sector (“grabbing hand”); in the other 
type, private-sector agents obtain unwarranted benefi ts from the state 
(“state capture”) (Frye and Shleifer 1997; Hellman et al. 2000; Shleifer 
and Vishny 1998). 
COMPARING TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
How do transition economies fare with regard to good governance? 
Since the primary objective here is to document the nature and scope 
of good governance in transition economies, it is useful to consider two 
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groups of countries: 1) those that were part of the former Soviet Union 
(FSU)12 and 2) those located in central and eastern Europe (CEE).13 
The distinction between FSU and CEE countries stems in part from the 
duration of the socialist experience and in part from prior experience 
with a market economy.      
Except for the Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), 
FSU countries had very little experience with market-oriented institu-
tions before the transition began in the early 1990s. Most FSU coun-
tries had exhibited a tradition-oriented feudal-type economic structure 
before the socialist revolution introduced central planning as a way to 
organize production and distribution. Under Soviet socialism, neither 
markets nor scarcity prices were used to allocate resources, materials, 
labor, or goods. Private property, in the productive sense, was pro-
hibited. Formally, for over seven decades, economic decision mak-
ing was highly centralized. Transactions were governed by the state, 
with no regard for profi t motive and little, if any, regard for effi ciency. 
Informally, individuals and fi rms often acted in their own self-interest 
rather than the state’s interest, and they traded in ways that mimicked 
market-oriented outcomes. However, unlike most transactions in market 
economies, informal transactions in FSU countries, particularly Russia, 
were rarely quid pro quo. Instead, the culture of kinship and reciproc-
ity governed social, political, and economic transactions (Ledeneva 
1998; Volkov 2000). This culture, combined with widespread shortages 
in the Soviet economy of basic household goods and material inputs 
to fi rms, created conditions where those who held a monopoly posi-
tion (from bureaucrats to salespeople) routinely exploited that position 
(Shlapentokh 2013). 
CEE countries, obliged after World War II to terminate their market-
oriented institutions and adopt the Soviet centrally administered struc-
ture, experienced a shorter-duration and somewhat different variety of 
socialism than FSU countries. Poland, for example, retained private 
agriculture rather than impose Soviet-style collectivized agriculture. 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia continued to participate in international 
markets. In contrast to the highly centralized Soviet model, Yugosla-
via introduced greater decision making by worker collectives. When 
the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, CEE countries reestablished their market-
oriented institutions. Unlike FSU countries, from the very beginning of 
the transition process CEE countries were populated with individuals 
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experienced not only in working within the legal and fi nancial infra-
structures that support a market economy, but also within a decentral-
ized social and political environment. 
Thus, the duration of the socialist experience and prior experience 
with market-oriented institutions provide a simple way to separate tran-
sition economies into two groups for good-governance comparison 
purposes. 
GOOD GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: 
COMPARING FSU WITH CEE COUNTRIES 
How well do transition economies fare with regard to good gov-
ernance? How much difference is there over the course of the transi-
tion process? Is there a signifi cant difference between FSU and CEE 
countries in terms of good governance? To address these questions, this 
section considers multiple governance measures. 
WGI Measures 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) encompass six cat-
egories of indicators that refl ect different dimensions of good gover-
nance. Since each of the composite indicators of WGI is standardized 
to have a zero mean and unit standard deviation, a positive score refl ects 
good governance, and a negative score refl ects the opposite. As seen in 
Figure 4.1, which captures WGI scores for the six composite measures 
for 2011, CEE countries consistently score in the positive range and 
FSU countries consistently score in the negative range. The governance 
contrast between FSU and CEE countries is the greatest for voice and 
accountability,14 with CEE countries scoring relatively high (second 
only to regulatory quality), and FSU countries scoring relatively poorly 
(worse than in every category except control of corruption). Both FSU 
and CEE countries perform relatively poorly on the control of corrup-
tion composite measure.15 
Because good governance often is linked to anticorruption measures 
(Kaufmann 2005), and because corruption (bad governance) is well docu-
mented in transition economies (see Abed and Davoodi [2000]; Hamadi, 
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Rihab, and Lotfi  [2009]; Hellman et al. [2000]; Shlapentokh [2013]; 
Steves and Rousso [2003]; and Tonoyan et al. [2010], for example), it 
makes sense to provide some discussion of this topic here. Perhaps most 
striking is the large literature related to corruption in former socialist 
economies: in April 2013, Google Scholar listed over 110,000 entries. 
In part, the literature is large because corruption involves a broad set of 
activities, varying by purpose16 and the agents or agencies involved.17 In 
part, the large corruption literature stems from ongoing efforts to mea-
sure and document corruption and estimate the costs it imposes.
Corruption is costly from an opportunity cost perspective because 
public resources are not going to their highest-valued use, but instead are 
being diverted for personal gain (Mauro 1995). Corruption contributes 
to lower tax revenues, which in turn reduce public services provided to 
the society as a whole. Social welfare is lower than it otherwise need be; 
wealth disparities grow. Corruption weakens formal institutions (legal, 
fi nancial), which undermines the development process generally and 
the pace of economic transformation for these former socialist coun-
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tries. In particular, corruption undermines competition, which is one of 
the pillars of a market-oriented economy.
Corruption also imposes direct fi nancial costs on fi rms and house-
holds. For fi rms, operational and transactional costs are higher (Aidis 
and Adachi 2007; Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz 2008; Johnson et al. 
2000). Estimates suggest that small fi rms in Russia pay over $500 mil-
lion in U.S. dollars (USD) monthly on bribes to offi cials, a fi gure that 
does not include payments made to organized crime; altogether, cor-
ruption payments are estimated at $10–$20 billion per year. For house-
holds, prices paid for goods and services include the cost of corruption 
(kickbacks, bribes, extortion). In Russia, corruption is estimated to add 
5–15 percent to prices paid by consumers (Levin and Satarov 2000). 
The general pattern of good-governance differences between FSU 
and CEE countries evident for the six WGI composite measures illus-
trated in Figure 4.1 also is evident, albeit on a smaller scale, in Figure 
4.2, which focuses on the levels and trends of control of corruption by 
country.18 CEE countries (shaded darker but not individually identifi ed) 
tend to score higher as the transition process progresses, although, ini-
tially, half of these countries exhibit scores comparable to the majority 
of FSU countries (shaded lighter but not identifi ed).19 
One explanation for the relatively small differences in control of 
corruption involves the nature and scope of formal and informal institu-
tions in FSU and CEE countries. 
Tonoyan et al. (2010) explain how formal institutions contribute to 
corruption: too many (and confl icting) economic and fi nancial regula-
tions create obstacles, which provide opportunities to engage in rent-
seeking behavior (corruption) as individuals and fi rms try to fi nd ways 
around these barriers. Failure to enforce the multitude of formal rules 
further contributes to rent-seeking behavior. 
Tradition, customs, and norms contribute to informal institutions 
that help to generate an environment in which corrupt behavior thrives. 
For example, in societies where kinship and reciprocity are impor-
tant cultural features, informal institutions tend to be more prevalent. 
However, informal institutions themselves need not contribute to cor-
ruption. In some instances, informal institutions complement formal 
institutions by strengthening efforts to comply with anticorruption 
agencies and regulations (Tonoyan et al. 2010). Where informal institu-
tions replace formal procedures, then corrupt behavior thrives. Dyker 
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(2012), Shlapentokh (2013), and others explain why the Soviet legacy 
of informal institutions is stronger in Russia and other FSU countries 
than in CEE countries. Moreover, the literature suggests that in societ-
ies where closed social networks predominate, and thus there is greater 
reliance on kinship or reciprocity, there will be a much greater likeli-
hood that corrupt behavior will be sustained. This is particularly true 
where social norms are governed by the belief that good ends justify 
means (or that whatever works is correct), and widespread (illegal) 
behavior is consistent with this belief (Ledeneva 1998; Volkov 2000).
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate differences in control of corruption for 
individual FSU and CEE countries, respectively. As seen in Figure 4.3, 
for the majority of FSU countries, there is no real improvement in con-
trol of corruption over time; in some instances, performance worsens 
on this governance measure. Levin and Satarov (2000) and Tonoyan et 
al. (2010) make the “path dependency” case: societies that start with a 
high level of corruption will fi nd it hard to reduce it.
Figure 4.2  Control of Corruption in FSU and CEE Countries
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Figure 4.3  Control of Corruption in FSU Countries













































SOURCE: World Bank (2014).
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Why do FSU countries have a high level of corruption? The Soviet 
legacy of a seller’s market created conditions that obliged individuals 
and fi rms to circumvent offi cial channels, which led to the widespread 
acceptance of the notion “the ends justify the means,” which further 
fueled corrupt (illegal) behavior. Shlapentokh (2013) focuses on the 
infl uence of feudal tendencies and big money as the driving force for 
corruption in FSU countries, particularly Russia. He also describes the 
strata of “little bribers” who extort money: medical personnel, educa-
tors, inspectors, clerks, traffi c offi cers, and the like. The fact that so 
many in Russia benefi t from corruption contributes to widespread toler-
ance of corrupt behavior.20 
In contrast, several CEE countries (Figure 4.4), likely infl uenced by 
European Union admission requirements, tended to improve corruption 
control as the transition progressed. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) 
develop a theoretical model to explain why some countries are more 
susceptible to “state capture”; the characteristics they include coincide 
more closely with cultural and other conditions in FSU countries than 
in CEE countries. 
The ability to exhibit good governance is infl uenced by susceptibil-
ity to “state capture,” which in turn has consequences for perceptions 
of government effectiveness.21 While FSU countries perform relatively 
well on this measure in comparison to other WGI measures (see Figure 
4.1), it appears to coincide with perceptions of fi rms and individuals 
that even though the “grabbing hand” of government is expensive, the 
benefi ts associated with informal payments are certain (Millar 1996; 
Shlapentokh 2013). As seen in Figure 4.5, with few exceptions, little 
change in perceptions of government effectiveness occurs among FSU 
countries over the course of the transition. Where perceptions improve 
(see Figure 4.6), it is mostly among FSU countries that have a positive 
score (exhibit relatively good governance on this dimension). Among 
CEE countries, two groups are evident: 1) those where government 
effectiveness is viewed relatively positively, and 2) those where the 
initial perceptions were negative, but over the course of the transition 
these perceptions improved (see Figure 4.7).
The relative performance of FSU and CEE countries on a related 
governance dimension, regulatory quality,22 is illustrated in Figure 4.8. 
On this dimension, the majority of CEE countries (shaded darker) score 
relatively high, and consistently so. Among FSU countries (shaded 
up15sapeogch4.indd   65 5/27/2015   1:12:17 PM
66   Linz
Figure 4.5  Government Effectiveness in FSU and CEE Countries
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Figure 4.6  Government Effectiveness in FSU Countries
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Figure 4.7  Government Effectiveness in CEE Countries




















Figure 4.8  Regulatory Quality in FSU and CEE Countries
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lighter), there appears to be a similar consistency over time for regula-
tory quality, but the countries fall into three groups in terms of general 
score on this measure (see Figure 4.9). CEE countries tend to exhibit an 
upward trend over the course of the transition (Figure 4.10).
Figure 4.11 depicts rule of law for FSU and CEE countries. While 
there is some dispersion among CEE countries (darker) which contrib-
utes to their composite score being relatively low (see Figure 4.1), for 
all but three FSU countries (lighter), perceived rule of law is consis-
tently in the negative range. As seen in Figure 4.12, for some FSU coun-
tries, the measure declines in value. In contrast, among CEE countries 
(Figure 4.13), there appears to be an improvement on this governance 
dimension over the course of the transition. Differences between the 
two groups of transition economies, and trends in each over time, may 
refl ect differences in the formal legal systems in the countries: even if 
the same laws are on the books, they may not be enforced in the same 
way (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2003; Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer 
2000); judicial institutions may process different types of cases or 
with different priorities. For rule of law to prevail, judges, prosecutors, 
police, and court functionaries need to act honestly and autonomously 
Figure 4.9  Regulatory Quality in FSU Countries
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Figure 4.10  Regulatory Quality in CEE Countries



















Figure 4.11  Rule of Law in FSU and CEE Countries
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Figure 4.12  Rule of Law in FSU Countries
SOURCE: World Bank (2014).
Figure 4.13  Rule of Law in CEE Countries
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with regard to the state and private-sector agents (EBRD 1999). Dif-
ferences may also stem from country variation in commitment to sup-
porting the type of individual rights and fi duciary responsibilities that 
facilitate emergence of a competitive market environment. 
Differences over time between FSU and CEE countries on voice 
and accountability are depicted in Figure 4.14. A clear pattern of sepa-
ration is evident. Even among FSU countries, a clear pattern of separa-
tion is also evident (see Figure 4.15), with the Baltic republics scoring 
consistently higher. For many other FSU countries, the score on this 
governance measure tends to decline. A steady improvement over time 
among CEE countries is seen in Figure 4.16. 
Differences between FSU and CEE countries in the fi nal component 
of the WGI governance measures are illustrated in Figure 4.17: political 
stability.23 In comparison to the other fi ve governance dimensions, there 
is more variability in political stability among CEE and FSU countries 
over the course of the transition. As seen in Figure 4.18, there is more 
dispersion among FSU countries on this measure as well. Not surpris-
Figure 4.14  Voice and Accountability in FSU and CEE Countries
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Figure 4.15  Voice and Accountability in FSU Countries













































Figure 4.16  Voice and Accountability in CEE Countries
SOURCE: World Bank (2014).
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Figure 4.17  Political Stability in FSU and CEE Countries
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Figure 4.18  Political Stability in FSU Countries
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ingly, CEE countries exhibit a general improvement in political stabil-
ity over time (Figure 4.19). 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties  
Freedom House annually provides two composite governance-
related measures for FSU, CEE, and other countries. As seen in Fig-
ure 4.20, CEE countries (darker) scored substantially higher than FSU 
countries (lighter) on both the political rights and civil liberties com-
posite measures in 2012. Differences between FSU and CEE countries 
might be explained by different levels of commitment to bolstering 
democratic institutions, or by differences in the extent to which politi-
cal leaders (national, regional, local) obtain and retain power. Differ-
ences might also be explained by the nature and scope of education and 
health care reforms, for example, or by policies targeted at immigra-
tion or freedom of the press. Such differences were driven in part by 
European Union membership requirements; most CEE countries have 
either joined or are candidate countries. Beyond the Baltic states, FSU 
countries have not been targeted for admission to the European Union.
Figure 4.19  Political Stability in CEE Countries
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Corruption Perceptions Index 
Figure 4.21 presents the 2012 CPI scores for individual FSU coun-
tries (lighter) and CEE countries (darker). The construction of this index 
is explained on page 57. While in both groups only three countries have 
a score exceeding 50, among CEE countries there are eight that score 
over 40, in comparison to one of the FSU countries. Indeed, the Baltic 
republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) account for three of the top four 
FSU countries. 
Index of Economic Freedom 
The fi nal governance measure considered here is the Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom. Figure 4.22 presents the 2011 scores for FSU (lighter) 
and CEE (darker) countries; the higher the score, the more economic 
freedom. 
Figure 4.20  Freedom House Composite Scores, FSU and CEE Countries
NOTE: Regional averages weighted by population.
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The pattern exhibited between FSU and CEE countries is clear, and 
it is invariant to the governance measure considered. Another perspec-
tive of the quality of governance in transition economies is provided 
by fi rm-level data. Such data not only are instrumental in undertaking 
empirical analyses of “state capture,” but also to establish the time and 
fi nancial costs imposed on fi rms by “bad” governance. 
GOOD GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: 
FIRMS’ PERSPECTIVE AND EXPERIENCE 
Empirical efforts and measures to assess good governance in transi-
tion economies tend to focus on aspects related to reducing or elimi-
nating corruption. Similarly, studies of corruption in transition econo-
mies and elsewhere tend to focus on characteristics and policies of the 
Figure 4.21  Corruption Perceptions Index, FSU and CEE Countries
SOURCE: Transparency International (2013).
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state, with particular attention paid to the extent of state intervention in 
economic transactions and the degree of discretionary power wielded 
by bureaucrats (the macro perspective). An important source of infor-
mation about the nature and scope of corruption, and thus the degree 
of good governance, comes from fi rms (the micro perspective). That 
is, the incidence and magnitude of corrupt activities that fi rms initiate 
(state capture) or are subjected to (grabbing hand), has direct conse-
quences for whether governance is deemed “good” or “bad.” Such data 
are invaluable in assessing the link between corporate governance and 
national governance (Hellman et al. 2000).
Among transition economies, fi rm-level data related to governance 
are collected by the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS) (Brunetti et al. 1997, Hellman et al. 2000). Some of 
the questions relate to the effi cacy of government institutions and poli-
cies,24 while others focus more explicitly on interactions between fi rms 
and state.25 The objective of this section is to summarize the most recent 
governance-related BEEPS data for FSU and CEE countries.
Figure 4.22  Index of Economic Freedom, FSU and CEE Countries
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation (2012).
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Hellman et al. (2000) use star charts for each country to report 
responses that relate to governance quality—fi rms’ evaluation of the 
performance of major public institutions (central government, parlia-
ment, central bank, customs service, judiciary, police, and military). 
They provide similar information for fi rms’ evaluation of the overall 
quality and effi ciency of services provide by utilities (telephone, elec-
tricity, and water), public health care, education, the post offi ce, and 
transportation/roads. Generally, fi rms in CEE countries tend to have 
higher evaluations (perceive better governance) than fi rms in FSU 
countries.26 Here the focus is more narrow, on perception and experi-
ence of corruption among participating fi rms.
Figure 4.23 reports the percent of fi rms in FSU countries (lighter) 
and CEE countries (darker) that report corruption (bad governance) as 
the biggest obstacle to doing business,27 while Figure 4.24 illustrates 
how big of an obstacle corruption is perceived to be. As seen in the two 
fi gures, while a greater proportion of FSU fi rms than CEE fi rms report 
Figure 4.23  Percentage of Firms Listing Corruption as Biggest Obstacle, 
CEE and FSU Countries
SOURCE: World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
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that corruption is a very severe obstacle to doing business, corruption 
is less likely to be viewed by FSU fi rms as the biggest obstacle. In part 
this can be explained by the effi cacy of the informal institutions in FSU 
countries (particularly Russia) that effectively guarantee the receipt of 
designated benefi ts associated with corrupt transactions. While costly 
to the fi rm, corruption is sustained by the culture of kinship and reci-
procity, which promotes the informal institutions that enforce corrupt 
transactions, thereby reducing uncertainty associated with deriving 
benefi ts from such transactions.
Corrupt transactions frequently involve bribe payments. Figures 
4.25 to 4.27 illustrate the type, frequency, and magnitude of bribe pay-
ments made by fi rms in FSU and CEE countries. Over 40 percent of 
the fi rms in the FSU sample report paying bribes for construction per-
mits (see Figure 4.25), and they report paying, on average, more than 
10 percent of the contract value (see Figure 4.27). Generally, a greater 
Figure 4.24  Percentage of Respondents Who Answered the Question 
“How Big of an Obstacle is Corruption?” in Each of Three 
Ways, CEE and FSU Countries
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percentage of fi rms in FSU countries (lighter) report making bribe pay-
ments for routine business activities (obtaining an operating license, 
utility connections, and the like) (see Figure 4.25), so it is not surpris-
ing to discover FSU fi rms reporting a higher incidence of interactions 
with government offi cials to make bribe payments (Figure 4.26). Nor is 
it surprising that a similar amount of time is spent by senior-level man-
agement in dealing with regulations (Figure 4.28). To put these fi gures 
into perspective, Figure 4.29 identifi es the number of FSU and CEE 
fi rms in the respective samples that applied for required permits and 
utility connections in the previous two years, with Figure 4.30 illustrat-
ing the average number of days required to obtain a particular service.
Similarities between FSU and CEE countries in terms of general 
obstacles encountered are evident in Figure 4.31. Tax-related issues 
(see also Figure 4.32) and business licensing account for major sources 
of obstacles to doing business. The main difference between the two 
groups of countries involves labor regulations, which are perceived as 
more problematic in CEE countries than in FSU countries.  
Figure 4.25  Percentage of Firms That Said Bribes Were Requested/
Expected for Nine Items, CEE and FSU Countries
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Figure 4.26  Bribe Frequency in Interactions with Government, CEE and 
FSU Countries (% of fi rms reporting)
SOURCE: World Bank (2015).
Figure 4.27  Magnitude of Bribes and Kickbacks, CEE and FSU 
Countries
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Figure 4.28  Time Tax: Percentage of Senior Management Time Spent 
Dealing with Regulations, CEE and FSU Countries
SOURCE: World Bank (2015).
Figure 4.29  Percentage of Firms That Have Applied for One of Six 
Things in the Past Two Years, CEE and FSU Countries
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Figure 4.30  Average Number of Days to Obtain One of Six Things, CEE 
and FSU Countries
SOURCE: World Bank (2015).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Governance involves the processes of decision making and deci-
sion implementation, and it takes place at the international, national, 
regional/local, and fi rm levels. Typically treated as a technical matter 
which can be solved by improved skill transfer, reorganizing struc-
tures, and providing additional resources, good governance is diffi cult 
to achieve. Good governance tends to emerge where there is bureau-
cratic competence, transparency, and predictability in the decision-
making and implementation processes, and when fi scal sustainability 
and accountability become the norm. 
Good governance is not an automatic outcome of democratiza-
tion and liberalization in transition (former socialist) economies. As 
Brӓutigam (2000) points out, good governance has some of the char-
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excluded from the benefi ts, there is little incentive to pay (devote the 
resources necessary to promote good governance), and there may eas-
ily be obstacles to good governance among those who would lose their 
privileged position. Good governance is less frequently exhibited in 
FSU countries than in CEE countries. Partly this is explained by the 
institutional environment that existed in the countries before the social-
ist period began. Partly it is explained by the importance of kinship and 
reciprocity—i.e., the extensive reliance on social capital for completing 
routine transactions. Partly it is explained by initial conditions relat-
ing to corruption (bad governance): countries where corruption is high 
at the beginning of the transition process fi nd it diffi cult to reduce or 
eliminate corruption over time. 
International assistance does not guarantee good governance, even 
when different aspects of good governance are conditions of receiv-
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Figure 4.31  Biggest Obstacles Facing Firms, CEE and FSU Countries
SOURCE: World Bank (2015).
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example), international assistance may even contribute to “bad” gov-
ernance: aid is diverted and corrupt individuals are not removed, local 
initiatives are “crowded out” as project managers and foreign experts 
oversee aid use, or countries embark on risky fi scal endeavors knowing 
that they likely will be bailed out, for instance.
While the contribution of good governance to economic, political, 
and social well being has been established, a few issues remain unre-
solved. How good does good governance need to be; is there a thresh-
old level? At what level does good governance need to be exhibited: 
at the fi rm level, the local level, the national level, the international 
level—or at some combination of these? Resolving such questions will 
enable policymakers to more effectively implement good governance. 
Figure 4.32  Working Days Spent on One of Four Things, CEE and FSU 
Countries
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Notes
 1. Williams and Siddique (2008) cite 85 studies that link governance quality to eco-
nomic outcomes.
 2. While the particular requirements may change over time or across countries, con-
ditionality is necessary in order to document to taxpayers or donors that the money 
provided by the aid-granting agency was “well spent.” At the same time, however, 
the governance literature points out the paradox that aid conditionality generates: 
aid to reduce poverty or promote social well-being requires good governance; 
countries where aid is most needed (i.e., where poverty conditions are most 
severe) exhibit limited ability to implement policies that promote characteristics 
of good governance. In a recent empirical study, Heckelman (2010) demonstrates 
that aid to transition economies did have positive consequences for some dimen-
sions of governance (judicial, electoral) but not others (media independence).
 3.  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) data show that 
investment in the early 1990s was between 20 and 50 percent lower than pre-
transition levels in former socialist economies (EBRD 2010).
 4.  While the literature is replete with studies that show that governance matters when 
it comes to economic performance, empirical studies that document causality pro-
vide mixed results (see, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2001]; 
Arndt and Oman [2006]; Glaeser et al. [2004]; and Mauro [1995]).
 5.  For a detailed description of the measures, see World Bank (2014).
 6.  For more information, see Freedom House (2012).
 7. For more information, see Transparency International (2013).
 8.  For a detailed description of the methodology used to construct the Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom, see Heritage Foundation (2012). 
 9.  “Economic freedom” is defi ned as “the fundamental right of every human to con-
trol his or her own labor and property.” See http://www.heritage.org/index/about.
 10.  For more information, see http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/
beeps.shtml.
 11.  The Life in Transition Survey, conducted by the EBRD, collects information 
from individuals in transition economies about their perceptions and experience 
with corruption. See http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/special/
transitionII.shtml.
 12.  Former Soviet Union or “FSU” countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The Baltic republics (Estonia, 
Lavtia, and Lithuania), while grouped here as FSU, are sometimes included with 
CEE countries, because they chose not to join the post-Soviet Commonwealth of 
Independent States. Data are not always available for all countries in all years; 
hence, Figure 4.6 lists only 12 FSU countries, not 15.
 13.  CEE countries include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. Data are not always available for all countries in all years; 
hence, fi gures may show a varying number of CEE countries.
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 14.  Voice and accountability is designed to capture not only the extent to which indi-
viduals are able to express their opinions and ideas before, during, and after gov-
ernmental decision making and implementation, but also their participation in 
making these decisions and the mechanism for imposing consequences associated 
with the decisions made. 
 15.  Control of corruption is designed to capture “perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (taken 
from the WGI site http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq). 
 16.  In some instances, the objective is to infl uence the content of rules/regulations/laws 
(public-sector outcomes), and the activity or transaction is initiated by private-
sector agents (“state capture”); in other instances, the objective of the activity or 
transaction is to use public-sector position for personal/private (fi nancial) gain 
(“grabbing hand”). 
 17.  Knack (2006) describes a variety of corrupt interactions: between fi rms, between 
households, between fi rms and government individuals/agencies, between house-
holds and government individuals/agencies, and so forth.
 18. Note that for Figures 4.2 through 4.19, the time intervals along the x axis change 
from two years to one year. This is because in 2003 Worldwide Governance Indi-
cators data began to be gathered on a yearly rather than a biennial basis.
 19.  We note that comparative analyses based on governance measures derived from 
perceptions that involve longitudinal data are subject to two types of infl uences. 
First, differences over time may stem from changes in the composite measure: 
components added or subtracted, or new sources of information included. Second, 
events may occur at a point in time (election, fi nancial crisis, public demonstra-
tions, for example) that causes perceptions to change. Accounting for these two 
dimensions, as WGI does, allows for more accurate assessments of change. 
 20. According to Shlapentokh (2013), “hundreds of thousands of employees in private 
companies” receive not only their offi cial salary but also a “salary in an envelope.” 
This practice of companies (reporting wages below what was actually paid to 
their employees) allows fi rms to reduce their tax bill, and it is readily accepted by 
employees.
 21.  The WGI composite measure of government effectiveness is designed to cap-
ture “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s com-
mitment to such policies” (see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index
.aspx#faq).
 22. Regulatory quality captures individuals’ and fi rms’ perceptions of government’s 
ability to “formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private-sector development” (see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/index.aspx#faq).
 23.  The political stability composite measure is designed to capture “perceptions of 
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconsti-
tutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism” 
(see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/faq.htm ).
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 24.  Firms are asked to rate the quality of public services provided by central gov-
ernment, the judiciary (legal system), and such local authorities (institutions) as 
police and utilities, for example, in order to evaluate whether and which institu-
tions impose obstacles to doing business.
 25.  Other questions focus on state intervention in fi rm operations (inspections, sub-
sidies, bribes, etc.) and on fi rms’ efforts to infl uence local or federal authorities 
(bribes, kickbacks, etc.). 
 26.  Hellman et al. (2000) note issues related to perception bias and the likelihood that 
individuals in a particular country might be subject to similar kvetching (complain-
ing) or kvelling (being overly optimistic). The survey design includes questions 
that can be verifi ed or matched up with objective data (exchange rate variability 
and telephone infrastructure), thus Hellman et al. are able to undertake analyses to 
assess whether and where (which country) perception bias is problematic. 
 27.  Sample selection by country took place in such a way as to generate a represen-
tative sample of fi rms. For discussion of the sample selection process, and the 
characteristics of the participating fi rms, see Hellman et al. (2000).
References
Abed, George T., and Hamid R. Davoodi. 2000. “Corruption, Structural 
Reforms, and Economic Performance in the Transition Economies.” IMF 
Working Paper No. 00/132. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. “The Colo-
nial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” 
American Economic Review 91(5): 1369–1401. 
Aidis, Ruta, and Yuko Adachi. 2007. “Russia: Firm Entry and Survival Barri-
ers.” Economic Systems 31(4): 391–411. 
Aidis, Ruta, Saul Estrin, and Tomasz M. Mickiewicz. 2008. “Institutions and 
Entrepreneurship Development in Russia: A Comparative Perspective.” 
Journal of Business Venturing 23(6): 656–672. 
Arndt, Christiane, and Charles Oman. 2006. Uses and Abuses of Gover-
nance Indicators. Development Centre Studies. Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. http://www.oecd.org/social/
poverty/usesandabusesofgovernanceindicators.htm (accessed February 20, 
2015). 
Baniak, Andrzej, Jacek Cukrowski, and Jan Herczyñski. 2005. “On the Deter-
minants of Foreign Direct Investment in Transition Economies.” Problems 
of Economic Transition 48(2): 6–28. 
Bardhan, Pranab, and Dilip Mookherjee. 2000. “Capture and Governance at 
Local and National Levels.” American Economic Review 90(2): 135–139. 
Berkowitz, Daniel, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard. 2003. “Eco-
up15sapeogch4.indd   88 5/27/2015   1:12:26 PM
Good Governance in Transition Economies   89
nomic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect.” European Eco-
nomic Review 47(1): 165–195. 
Bevan, Alan A., and Saul Estrin. 2004. “The Determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment into European Transition Economies.” Journal of Comparative 
Economics 32(4): 775–787. 
Bevan, Alan, Saul Estrin, and Klaus Meyer. 2004. “Foreign Investment Loca-
tion and Institutional Development in Transition Economies.” International 
Business Review 13(1): 43–64. 
Brӓutigam, Deborah. 2000. “Aid Dependence and Governance.” EGDI Work-
ing Paper No. 2000:1. Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department 
for International Development Cooperation, Expert Group on Develop-
ment Issues. http://www.sti.ch/fi leadmin/user_upload/Pdfs/swap/swap404
.pdf (accessed January 19, 2015). 
Brunetti, Aymo, Gregory Kisunko, and Beatrice Wedner. 1997. “Institutional 
Obstacles to Doing Business: Region-by-Region Results from a Worldwide 
Survey of the Private Sector.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 1323. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Craig, David, and Doug Porter. 2006. Development beyond Neoliberalism? 
Governance, Poverty Reduction, and Political Economy. New York: Rout-
ledge. 
Dyker, David A. 2012. Economic Policy Making and Business Culture: Why Is 
Russia So Different? London: Imperial College Press. 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 1999. Transi-
tion Report: Ten Years of Transition. London: European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development. 
———. 2010. Transition Economies: Macroeconomic Indicators. London: 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Freedom House. 2012. Freedom House. Washington, DC: Freedom House. 
https://freedomhouse.org/ (accessed April 3, 2015).
Frye, Timothy, and Andrei Shleifer. 1997. “The Invisible Hand and the Grab-
bing Hand.” American Economic Review 87(2): 354–358. 
Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei 
Shleifer. 2004. “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” Journal of Economic 
Growth 9(3): 271–303. 
Hamadi, Fakhfakh, Ben Atitallah Rihab, and Ben Jedidia Lotfi . 2009. “Gov-
ernance and Economic Growth in Transition Countries: A Reading in the 
Vision of the Institutional Theory.” International Journal of Economic Pol-
icy in Emerging Economies 2(1): 1–22. 
Heckelman, Jac C. 2010. “Aid and Democratization in the Transition Econo-
mies.” Kyklos 63(4): 558–579. 
Hellman, Joel S., Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann. 2002. “Far from 
up15sapeogch4.indd   89 5/27/2015   1:12:26 PM
90   Linz
Home: Do Foreign Investors Import Higher Standards of Governance in 
Transition Economies?” Working paper. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00818/WEB/PDF/FARFROMH
.PDF (accessed January 20, 2015). 
Hellman, Joel S., Geraint Jones, Daniel Kaufmann, and Mark Schankerman. 
2000. “Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms 
and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Econo-
mies.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2312. London: 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
Heritage Foundation. 2012. Methodology. Washington, DC: Heritage Founda-
tion. http://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology (accessed April 3, 
2015). 
Johnson, Simon, Daniel Kaufmann, John McMillan, and Christopher Wood-
ruff. 2000. “Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unoffi cial Activity after Com-
munism.” Journal of Public Economics 76(3): 495–520. 
Kaufmann, Daniel. 2005. “Myths and Realities of Governance and Corrup-
tion.” In Global Competitiveness Report 2005–06. Geneva: World Eco-
nomic Forum, pp. 81–98. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2007. “Governance Indicators: Where Are 
We, Where Should We Be Going?” World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 4370. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2010. “The World-
wide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues.” World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682130 (accessed January 20, 2015). 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón. 1999. “Governance 
Matters.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2196. Wash-
ington, DC: World Bank. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/
govmatters1.pdf (accessed February 20, 2015).
Knack, Stephen. 2006. “Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia: A Critique of the Cross-Country Indicators.” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 3968. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Lambsdorff, Johann Graf. 2007. The Methodology of the Corruption Percep-
tions Index 2007. Berlin: Transparency International; and Passau, Ger-
many: University of Passau. http://www.icgg.org/downloads/CPI_2007
_Methodology.pdf (accessed January 21, 2015). 
Ledeneva, Alena V. 1998. Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, 
and Informal Exchange. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Levin, Mark, and Georgy Satarov. 2000. “Corruption and Institutions in Rus-
sia.” European Journal of Political Economy 16(1): 113–132. 
up15sapeogch4.indd   90 5/27/2015   1:12:26 PM
Good Governance in Transition Economies   91
Mauro, Paolo. 1995. “Corruption and Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics 110(3): 681–712. 
Millar, James. 1996. “What’s Wrong with the Mafi ya Anyway? An Analysis of 
the Economics of Organized Crime in Russia.” In Economic Transition in 
Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Bartlomiej Kaminski, ed. Armonk, 
NY: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 206–219. 
Pistor, Katharina, Martin Raiser, and Stanislaw Gelfer. 2000. “Law and Finance 
in Transition Economies.” Economics of Transition 8(2): 325–368. 
Saisana, Michaela, and Andrea Saltelli. 2012. Corruption Perceptions Index 
2012: Statistical Assessment. Luxembourg: European Commission, Joint 
Research Centre. http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/
JRC77239 (accessed January 21, 2015). 
Santiso, Carlos. 2001. “Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World 
Bank and Conditionality.” Georgetown Public Policy Review 7(1): 1–22. 
Shlapentokh, Vladimir. 2013. “Corruption, the Power of State and Big Busi-
ness in Soviet and Post-Soviet Regimes.” Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies 46(1): 147–158. 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1998. The Grabbing Hand: Govern-
ment Pathologies and Their Cures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Steves, Franklin, and Alan Rousso. 2003. “Anti-Corruption Programmes in 
Post-Communist Transition Countries and Changes in the Business Envi-
ronment, 1999–2002.” EBRD Working Paper No. 85. London: European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Tonoyan, Vartuhi, Robert Strohmeyer, Mohsin Habib, and Manfred Perlitz. 
2010. “Corruption and Entrepreneurship: How Formal and Informal Institu-
tions Shape Small Firm Behavior in Transition and Mature Market Econo-
mies.” Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 34(5): 803–831. 
Transparency International. 2013. Transparency International. Berlin: Trans-
parency International. http://www.transparency.org (accessed April 3, 
2015).
United Nations. 2013. What Is Good Governance? New York: United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacifi c. New York: 
United Nations. http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/fi les/good-governance
.pdf (accessed January 22, 2015). 
Volkov, Vadim. 2000. “Organized Violence, Market Building, and State For-
mation in Post-Communist Russia.” In Economic Crime in Russia, Alena 
V. Ledneva and Marina Kurkchiyan, eds. Boston: Kluwer Law, pp. 43–62. 
Weiss, Thomas G. 2000. “Governance, Good Governance, and Global Gover-
nance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges.” Third World Quarterly 21(5): 
795–814. 
up15sapeogch4.indd   91 5/27/2015   1:12:26 PM
92   Linz
Williams, Andrew, and Abu Siddique. 2008. “The Use (and Abuse) of Gover-
nance Indicators in Economics: A Review.” Economics of Governance 9(2): 
131–175. 
Williamson, John. 1990. “What Washington Means by Policy Reform.” In 
Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? John Williamson, 
ed. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, pp. 
7–20. 
World Bank. 2014. Worldwide Governance Indicators. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
(accessed March 26, 2015).
———. 2015. Beeps Data Portal. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://beeps
.prognoz.com/beeps/MultiHandler.ashx?slc=AboutBeeps (accessed April 
3, 2015). 
up15sapeogch4.indd   92 5/27/2015   1:12:26 PM
